‘Existing military doctrine and training will very quickly prove challenging or out of date during the initial combat of a new war,’ a hypothesis associated with the eminent historian Sir Michael Howard. Before 2022, many theorists and pundits were strongly of the opinion that there was no chance of Putin invading Ukraine. Many of us held this position despite the ongoing conflict in the east of Ukraine and the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Maybe it was a sort of self-deception, and this in itself is a topic that we will explore in a future issue. But when the Russian forces invaded, the harsh reality set in, and the Ukrainian military was ready. It was, in fact, the Russian plans and performance that were subpar, and when their decapitation tactic failed—their initial attempt at a lightning advance combined with neutralizing the political leadership—they were left exposed.
Perhaps it was due to overconfidence, poor intelligence, or a combination of factors, but the Russian military showed poor planning, a lack of coordination, and questionable leadership and training. There is little doubt that many international intelligence and special operations operatives supported the Ukrainian military in the defense of Kyiv, but the credit has to go to the Ukrainian soldiers on the ground. The Russians were plagued with issues on the northern front, including terrain negotiability challenges and massive traffic jams, which gave Ukrainian anti-tank, light infantry, drones, missile units, and special operations, a row of sitting ducks.
The Ukrainian tactical performance was bolstered by President Zelensky, who made what can perhaps be regarded as one of the strongest acts of political war leadership in the 21st century. Appearing on video in the streets of Kyiv, with several ministers, he made it clear to the Americans, and the West, that he was not leaving. And in a line, that although disputed and partly myth, is now one for the history books, Zelensky allegedly told the Americans, ‘I need ammunition, not a ride’.
The continuities of war teach us that, despite the broad move against the ‘Great Man (Person) Theory’, we still need elements of individual leadership to galvanize a force – and Zelensky continues a tradition that one could trace through history – to Pericles’ funeral oration, Alexander the Great’s speech at the mutiny of Opis, Julius Caesar’s words to the 13th Legion, Winston Churchill’s ‘Fight on the Beaches, and never surrender’, and Fidel Castro’s ‘History will absolve me’. Also, there is a continuity in that a military must study the terrain – Hannibal managed to cross the Alps with a sizable force, yet a Russian mechanized force got bogged down in Ukraine.
As in boxing, ‘styles make fights’. It relates to the choice of investment and direction – conventional warfare and weapon systems, irregular warfare, or special operations among other areas. In practice, what worked for Russia in the War in Georgia in 2008 was perhaps different from Ukraine in 2022-2024. Despite many saying it is no longer relevant, the mechanized conventional and combined arms warfare practiced in the Second World War is still important, and although technology has advanced many tactics, techniques, and procedures are very similar. Another link can be drawn between the experience of trench warfare in Ukraine and the experience of many in what is regarded by some as the archaic First World War. That is to say that there is value in training for a previous war, and for a future war. When considering how and what resource to dedicate to the new conflict, it is a case of prioritization, and for any state having sufficient strategic slack, and reserves is important. That way a country will be able to redirect resources as needed which in turn could assist with potential discontinuities and changes.
It appears that continuities and discontinuities live side by side. Many military scholars and writers talk about the discontinuities in Russian innovation and command as well as the limits and discontinuity in US strategic thought. Discontinuities can occur at many levels and some have recently claimed that conventional war was a thing of the past. Many academics wrote books on the purported change in the ‘nature’ of war, and the so-called new wars – perhaps something better suited for the classroom and not the battlefield. It was the late Sir Michael, himself a war veteran, who added what for many is the final word when confronted with the premise that ‘conventional war had ended’, in responding that we should ‘never say never’.
Perhaps a short-term view of politics and war makes us focus on what is immediate. The Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had a particular flavor – it was mostly asymmetric in character. Although the experience and result were less than ideal for the West, it should not negate the importance of all arms battle and mechanized warfare, sea and air power, as well as hybrid war; or planning for unconventional operations. At its heart, tactical answers are always limited when used to answer complex political questions.
Max and Tony
The War Diarists
