Sudan: How Did It Come to This and How Do We Reverse This Descent into Hell? (II)

Sudanese protesters on the train from Atbara to Khartoum. Photo by Osama Elfaki, CC BY-SA 4.0

This special issue of the War Diaries is a continuation of part 1, recently released and deals with the complex conflict in Sudan. Its author Peter de Clercq, a seasoned UN diplomat who retired at the Assistant Secretary General level provides an insightful analysis. See the podcast here War and Peace with Peter de Clercq – Underground Strategy | Acast

A Tale of Two Generals and a Tortured Nation Held Hostage: All to Lose

The current fight between two generals at the expense of the innocent population of Sudan is the outcome of a complex process of betrayal and self-interest on the part of its two main actors: Burhan and Hemedti. They joined forces temporarily to execute Bashir’s removal but in the absence of their former master who so effectively used a divide and rule approach to keep them at bay, a confrontation became inevitable: Sudan was not big enough for the both of them.

Hemedti, albeit despised by the Khartoum elites due to his lack of formal education and refinement, used the power entrusted to him by Bashir not just to consolidate control over Darfur and its borders with neighbouring Chad and Libya, but also to amass a sprawling business empire which includes, inter alia, enormous mining (gold and iron) and transport interests. He is considered one of the richest people in Sudan by now.¹ He has moreover become an important international player in that he has provided, on demand, fighting forces into active conflicts like Libya (through a close cooperation with the warlord Khalifa Haftar) as well as in Yemen on the side of the anti-Houthi coalition. 

And what about Hemedti’s nemesis: General Burhan, who formally is still Sudan’s Head of State, but has so far not seen it necessary to address the nation he nominally leads (and obliterates) on what is happening? Once the coup in 2021 was executed, Burhan’s fate was sealed. The lack of decisiveness of Prime Minister Hamdok to take on the military and to squarely embark on Security Sector Reform made the armed elements lose patience in him and move him aside. But that meant those armed elements, and in particular the person recognized as the coup-leader, had no way back towards being entrusted by the population with the legitimate leadership of the country. Burhan is generally considered as a throw-back to the NCP regime, and state institutions which knew a brief period of “cleansing and renewal” after the revolution and during Hamdok’s leadership, are now firmly back in the hands of the same people who were in charge during Bashir. Burhan’s motives of supporting the revolution have been clearly exposed as self-centered and representing a group that preferred to betray their former absolute leader in order to avoid their own shipwreck.

So far, despite the current tactical dominance on the ground by the RSF, the military establishment in Sudan is holding together under Burhan and there have been no signs of a secondary coup – yet. Maybe the situation is not clear enough as to who will come out on top, or maybe the military pre-empt a bloody reckoning by Darfurians which would likely follow a defeat of the regular forces and have therefore decided to stick together. We understand from sources inside Sudan, however, that the military have actively started to target former senior military figures who they consider as potentially rivalling Burhan’s “leadership”.

In addition, for Burhan personally, his role in the coup and the earlier suppression of the revolution – as well as his unwillingness to allow accountability for the massacres – has put him in a lose-lose position, unless he comes out the winner of the armed conflict. 

Hemedti and the RSF: Heart of the Problem, Part of the Problem, or Part of the Solution?

Hemedti, whereas uneducated and reviled by the elites, has displayed a street-smart attitude towards communication and image building. He has engaged a Canadian PR firm² that has attempted to portray him to the international community as an anti-establishment, pro-civilian leader who opposed the military coup in 2021. Families we are in touch with in Khartoum have confirmed that they were escorted at times by RSF forces to safer ground or to evacuation zones. Moreover, and not widely reported by the media, is the reality that RSF even after the long-lasting fighting thus far are in control of most of the streets and neighbourhoods in Khartoum. Consequently, the regular military is resorting to aerial bombardments, rocketing and artillery barrages on built-up and popular parts of town where the RSF has effectively entrenched itself.

However, despite some of these reports, none of us should be fooled by who Hemedti is, what drives him, or even see him as a major element to the “solution” of the “Sudan problem”. Despite his efforts to have PR firms rewrite his history, he is a ruthless warlord with massive economic self-interest in an outcome where he remains unaccountable for exactly what he has unleashed on the innocent civilian populations of Darfur, Khartoum and the rest of the country over a period of several decades. According to Human Rights Watch, Hemedti has undoubtedly been directly involved in a massive array of war crimes and potentially crimes against humanity for which he must answer to the Sudanese people.³

In this regard, I had my own “déjà-vu” when visiting Darfur in February as I witnessed a group of armed men on camels, riding out of the area we just visited. The same village was now asking for reconstruction assistance from the international community after being raided by what they described as Janjaweed militias, and I noticed quite some people in uniform amongst the villagers. Local “leaders” praised Hemedti personally for having visited and provided a few water points after the raids (obscenely enough carried out by the same forces that had enabled him to rise to power). Villagers had also “agreed to” signing a peace and reconciliation agreement in return for the generous assistance provided to them…. 

According to recent rumours, Hemedti has been killed in the fighting as he has not been seen in public for a long time. In addition, the increased lack of discipline of his fighters, demonstrated through blatant looting, extortion and other forms of reported violence appears to point at a breakdown in command structures. 

What Is Next?

Let us be clear, there is no “good side” amongst the warring parties. Unfortunately, moreover, the conflict is already widening and other armed groups, including those who were part of the Juba Peace Agreement are about to choose sides no doubt hoping to ensure they are well positioned by the time power is carved up around the table.⁴ There are also efforts under way by the military to undermine Hemedti’s leadership by appealing to tribal leaders to challenge him within his own, Rizeigat, community.⁵ There seems to be a growing portrayal in mainstream western media of the RSF as a “rebel” force which may lead us to forget that, only months ago, both opponents were hand in glove in a suppressive, state-led dynamics vis-à-vis the legitimate demands for enhanced democratic rights.

Both sides have decided on a war to the end. None of them are in any way concerned by the effects this may have on the country or its population, notwithstanding some of the rhetoric used. An ineffective and plentiful array of pledges and promises of mediation support has rained on the belligerents, but the plethora of voices has had no weight or significance, other than a few broken ceasefire agreements. Even the recent, most promising mediation effort led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the US (towards a humanitarian ceasefire) were suspended in view of serious violations by both parties.

Sudan, and Khartoum in particular, has turned into an apocalyptic landscape where civilians risk being bombed, rocketed, looted or shot. Prisons have been opened, banks are being plundered by men in uniform and it really does not matter anymore what colour those uniforms are. What is clear, is that the violence must stop. All the immediate legitimate emphasis on evacuation of foreigners or even humanitarian cross-border action notwithstanding, people of Sudan must be able to enjoy their most basic of rights; the right to live – in safety. That is why most countries have armies and police, to uphold and protect that right, not to kill and rob them.  

Making Peace in Sudan

The recently launched humanitarian appeal for Sudan is one of the few signs of remaining international interest in this quickly fading priority on the global agenda. However, as all those who advocated for significant resources for the assistance and protection to affected populations in Sudan mentioned, these laudable and necessary actions are secondary to an immediate stoppage of the fighting in which the innocent civilians are victimized. 

With the current non-interventionist dynamics inside the political institutions of the UN, it is unlikely that international action could be mandated by the world body in the near future to stop the war, establish, and maintain peace through some type of UN, AU or hybrid mechanism. 

Moreover, one of the Permanent members of the security council is already likely involved in supporting one of the warring parties (the RSF) through proxys in neighbouring Libya. Links between Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar and the Wagner group are evident,⁶ as well as Hemedti’s own connections with both.⁷ This makes the option of any Security Council Resolution arguing for decisive non-partisan action highly likely to be veto-ed.

One of the options to be considered, could be a powerful contact group comprising bilateral stakeholders with a regional interest and prerequisite resources to back up their intention to put an end to this horrific reality. The situation has a great potential to spread beyond the borders of Sudan and affect the fragile political and security realities in the Horn of Africa, North Africa and beyond. This is why we have seen a strong interest and role so far of Saudi Arabia, a country which has displayed the ambition to position itself regionally and globally on the political and economic scenes. Egypt cannot be left out of the equation, as it has a direct interest in the internal stability of Sudan and is already closely connected to its leadership (on the military side). The UAE has maintained relations with one of the warring parties (Hemedti) and moreover has shown a keen interest in the dynamics around the Horn of Africa as exemplified by its role in Somalia (and Somaliland). And finally, there would be a need for a P5 member with a strong understanding and historical interest in Sudan and the region. Logically, this would be the United Kingdom, which has a historical connection to Sudan and still yields significant influence in the country. The US is already engaged, however the more prominence it gains, the more any initiative it is involved in will be subject to a push back from the Russian side.   

In other words, there may well be a logic to expand on this contact group, but it would be equally important to keep it small to avoid the risk of its internal dynamic and potential to act being complicated, pulled apart, politicized and/or watered down.

No doubt, questions could be asked why UN, AU or IGAD should not be on the contact group list either. I think I have dealt with the UN question before. Whereas it can and should play a role in the establishment of such a contact group (and could potentially be a member, facilitator, or observer), the UN’s credibility as an effective leader in peace making and -keeping has significantly suffered from the past integrated peace missions it conducted in the country. Then there is the SC dynamic which I have also spoken about, which will result, at best, in a highly flawed, under resourced and relatively powerless mandate for a future UN mission. This is likely to also apply in the case of a hybrid AU/UN mission, as UNAMID has proven. Such an AU or hybrid construction would moreover be entirely dependent on an equally ineffective SC mandate and UN funding, whilst suffering in addition from a schizophrenic set of reporting lines. IGAD has been a relatively effective tool for political management of peace building processes in Somalia but has been affected by the internal violent dynamics inside Ethiopia and is still recovering from this. It moreover lacks any peace enforcement capabilities, therefore its role can be foreseen at a later stage, once “physical” peace has been established. 

In conclusion, I would hope that a realization has sunk in that the Juba Peace Agreement is a highly flawed peace process both from the point of view of who is in it, and who is not. It has suffered from a lack of guarantors and inability to deal with spoilers, thus leading up to the current apocalyptic episode. Simply picking up from where we left before the situation exploded would be a massive mistake on the part of the international community. Yet this is what several parties aspiring to get involved are arguing for.

It would appear to me (and other observers) that we have lacked – or at best underutilised – the analytical capacity to understand and thereby acknowledge the fundamental motivations of the main armed actors in the ongoing conflict. We were so ready, collectively, to go for a “quick fix” that we became blind for the risks and naïve to the malicious intentions of those trying to preserve their power and avoid accountability. In this regard, we have ignored the very principles that underpinned the revolution in 2019 which for a short time gave hope to the Sudanese people that a new future and social contract was dawning on them. 

A Return to Civilian Rule and Democracy in Sudan

All future peace- and state building efforts in Sudan must be centered around organizing, unifying and empowering civil society that has proven strong enough to depose a tyrant, yet was unable to follow through and map an implementable way forward. It is simply not enough to say what you don’t want without indicating and pursuing an alternative. Such an alternative necessarily includes for those that drove the 2019 revolution to take political responsibility, whilst protecting new leadership against spoilers. Whereas Abdallah Hamdok could or would not build on the massive support he had on the street, those in the forefront of the protests also did not present themselves as civilian leaders willing to prosecute the demands they represented. Reversely, too much space exists currently for opportunistic groups and individuals to dominate the political process, especially if they are armed. A future peace process In Sudan therefore needs external guarantors, hence the idea of a “contact group”.

A durable and sustainable return to civilian rule in Sudan, a country which was ruled by military leaders for most of its recent history, will be an arduous and risky undertaking, fraught with potential setbacks and pitfalls. Before the state (re)building process is undertaken, agreement should be reached on the fundamentals of a social contract and how mutual accountabilities between state and citizens are defined therein. Parallel to other political processes in extremely fragile environments like Somalia, a selection process could be initiated by the Contact Group (UN and AU could support such a process) that would result in a governing council of civil society representatives, drawn from professional, private sector and academic circles. Members of this council, responsible for designing the roadmap outlining constitutional, developmental, and institution building parameters, would be selected based on criteria of non-involvement in the conflict dynamics, moral, political and economic integrity and professional/technical capability (as well as gender balance). They should be nominated by the regions of Sudan and ultimately confirmed by the members of the contact group (ensuring that the selection criteria are indeed fully complied with). This national civilian ruling structure would deliver a provisional constitution, a design of a state structure, a set of Peace and State Building Goals as well as a pathway to future elections. These deliverables would then become part of a “Deal” between the international community and Sudan, which can furthermore be quantified and supported by external stakeholders. This “representational” interim phase is key as it would be a major mistake, in line with our usual “reflex behaviour”, to go for quick elections. Our equation of restoration of democracy with early elections has already been responsible for so many stunted state-building efforts elsewhere, and Sudan deserves better.

As much as empowerment of civil society is at the heart of the future of Sudan, this needs to be accompanied by a deliberate approach towards the major historical “spoilers” in the political scene of the country: its security institutions. I have mentioned the need for Security Sector Reform earlier and it should be clear from the above, that this goes well beyond the classic restructuring, DDR and retraining templates that fail to deal with the fundamentals of the “state capture” in which we have seen security and intelligence actors assume a dominant role. Security Sector Reform starts with a fundamental rethink of and willingness to deal with the role of security institutions as purveyors of human security. This includes the role of the security establishment as described in a new constitution, the accountabilities of the security institutions to civilian political leadership as well as the links between maintenance of order, the justice chain and the rule of law.

We owe a second chance to the millions that had the courage to stand up in Sudan’s revolution and this time we must make sure that their ideas and ideals are heard and acted upon. However, who is willing to provide the political muscle, resources and resolve to physically enter the scene and therefore step into harm’s way? And how to do this in a manner that leads to sustainable peace rather than providing a shaky base for the next conflict? It would seem to me that a sustainable solution for Sudan would be predicated by a combination of new, aspiring international players (like Saudi Arabia, UAE – making use of the Gulf Cooperation Coordination architecture, Egypt and maybe Turkey), multilateral actors (UN, AU and IGAD) and established global known quantities (US and SC Members) who would come in at different parts of the process. 

Short, Intermediate, and Long-Term Steps Towards a New Sudan

In the short term: Immediate sanctions should be imposed on all those involved in the fighting and subsequently to those who join it. Ideally this would have been framed as part of a Security Council initiative, but if this fails due to the “veto trap”, a broad “coalition of the willing” could be constituted with consequential strategic and economic impact. An armed stabilizing presence, however difficult to conceive at this stage, must be an integral element to halt the shooting, protect the civilian populations and monitor respect of any future ceasefire. This presence can be constituted under a mandate provided by the contact group, and troops should be provided by non-neigbouring countries. Particularly GCC countries (Saudi Arabia) come to mind in this respect.

In the intermediate term: the above-mentioned civilian transitional leadership group would be the bridge between the violent past, controlled by non-representative and self-centered elites and a new architecture that puts citizens and their accountable relationship with institutions at the heart of a “New Sudan” reflecting the spirit and intention of the revolution of 2019.

In the longer term: Once the basic architecture and peace roadmap have been designed, the UN and AU could be brought in as convenors and implementors of the Peace- and State Building Process. At this point in time, the “coalition of the willing” construction could be folded into a Security Council sanctioned small and light political mission that would be constituted as a coordinating platform, with substantive tasks (such as constitutional reform, security sector reform, stabilization and recovery) undertaken by a combination of regular UN Country Team Agencies, regional organisations and bilaterals, rather than as part of an “integrated mission”. First task of such a mission would be to implement the work of the the civilian transitional leadership group around a “social contract”. This social contract, outlining mutual accountability and responsibility between the Sudanese state and the population would be the basis around which division of labour between external actors could be organized – under credible Sudanese leadership. 

Peter de Clercq

War Diaries by Antonio Garcia and Max Lauker

Podcast – Underground Strategy | Instagram | X |

1. Researchers such as Paul Reeves, a longtime observer of Sudan, has convincingly documented some of Heme. ↩︎
2. In 2019, Hemedti turned to the Canadian lobbying firm Dickens and Madson, which is run by former Israeli intelligence official Ari Ben-Menashe according to Al Jazeera ↩︎
3. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2020/07/Sudan%20clean%20QA%20MA%20updated.pdf ↩︎
4. “Mini” Arco Minawi issued a “call to arms” on  Twitter 28 May 2023 for “all honourable citizens in Darfur” to arm and defend themselves ↩︎
5. It is widely reported that the military have courted Musa Hilal, a credible tribal Rizeigat leader, to challenge Hemedti’s dominance based on tribal allegiances. ↩︎
6. There are numerous well-researched international media reports around direct contacts (including visits to Sudan) of senior Wagner officials and Hemedti and RSF leadership. Moreover, CNN has found evidence of direct supplies of missiles from Wagner to the RSF, which has not been denied by the former. ↩︎
7. Hemedti’s fighters are directly involved in the conflict in Libya: see; the Guardian of 23 April 2023: Libyan Warlord could plunge Sudan into a drawn-out “nightmare conflict.” ↩︎